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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
In the Mattcr of the Estate
of
ALBERT J. DUQUESNE, also
known as A. J. DUQUESNE,

Case No.
12908

Deceased.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
POINT I.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
74-4-10 (1953), "MEANS JUST "\VHAT IT

SAYS."

The most important issue presented by this case
is, whether the first sentence of Utah Code Annotated
section 74-4-10 ( l 95!J) is a legitimation statute or
whether it is a statute of inheritance only, ·because, if
the statute is one purporting to alter staus from illegitimate to legitimate, it may be appropriate for the Court
to apply the laws of status of Illinois, while, if it is a
statute granting the right of inheritance only, it does
not affect status and raises no choice of laws question,
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since it is a statute governing rights in property at the
situs of such property.
Respondent begins his argument from the whollr
undocumented and unsupported premise that the ke;.
statute in question is a legitimation statute, whici
would, if applicable, change the status of an acknowl·
edged child from illegitimate to legitimate. The kerstone of his entire argument is the following nakro
statement:
"74-4-10 UCA 1953 means just what it
says, that every illegitimate is (I) an heir of
his mother and ( 2) an heir of the father who

the child. It is a statute of inheri·
tance, limited to succession from the mother,
and it is the Utah statute of legitimation for
inheritance through the father." Brief for Respondent at 5. (Emphasis a<l<lecl).

1
Respondent's brief later paraphrases the same unsul· II
sta11tiated allegation, as if repetition alone woul
ti
establish the argument: "The statute granted inher
tance, limited as it says, to the Uta }l 1'II eg1't'1mate c/111.
from its mother aml from the Utah father who /epr
t•l1
th
mrdcs the Utah child." Brief for Respondent 8 "
t II'1
sp
(Emphasis added). Respondent's argumen , ;
tio
· tal issue in 'i
simply assumes the answer to tl le p1vo
str
case and having crot past that awkward matter \!'I
'
lout even joining issue, calmly proceeds to CJ eh t 1
8
ous authorities for the conceded general rules t •
0
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Jaw of the domicile of the parties, rather than the law
of the situs, normally governs status, and that legitimation statues raise questions of status.

Because the issue, so conveniently evaded by Respondent, is crucial anfl because of confusion which may
have been created by
erroneous characteriiatior1 of section 74-4-10, the language of the statute
itself is set out again herewith.

Illegitimate Children-Inheritance by. Every
illegitimate child is an heir of the person who
acknowledges himself to be the father of such
child, and in all cases is an heir of his mother;
and inherits his or her estate, in whole or in
part, as the case may be, in the same manner
as if he had been born in lawf1tl wedwck. The
issue of all marriages null in law, or dissolved
by divorce are legitimate. (Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 74-4-10 (1953)
Respondent persistently substitutes the word "legitimates", which is not contained in the first sentence of
the statute, for the word "acknowledges", which is contained in the first sentence of the statute.
'Vith this distinction in mind, it becomes apparent
that the authorities and cases relied upon by the Respondent, are not relevant to the interpretation of section 74-4-10, because those authorities deal with constniction and application of true legitimation statutes,

...
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which are essentially unlike section 74-4-10; On tl,
other hand, .Appellants ha,·e taken great care in the:
brief to demonstrate to the Court that the cases aw
authorities upon which they rely do inrnke
which are, in all releYant respects, identical to secfo.
7 4-4-10, an cl that all such statutes have specifically betr
held. not to be legitimation statutes, but to be
of inheritance only.
Hespondent's unsupported premise, that sectioL
74-4-10 is a legitimation statute, is essential to his fur·

ther argument that Utah Code Annotated sertio'1
78-:J0-1 :2, ( 19/>a), which provides for legitimation oh
illegitimate child hy adoption, is a "companion statute'
to section 7 4-4-10, because he argues, both statutes an
legitimation statutes. Brief for Respondent at 16. Witlr
out his unsupported first premise, his "companion"
argument would fail and Respondent's brief could no:
then place reliance upon cases interpreting statutn
which provide for legitimation by adoption, such as
In re Porney's Estate, 43 XeY. 227, 184 P. 206 (19191,
(brief for Respondent at 13, 14) ; Eddie t'. Eddie, i
.N'.D. 376, 79 .N'.\Y. 8;3() (1899), (brief for Respondent
at 16); In re Presle!/s Estate, 113 Okla. 160,
( 1!):24), (brief for H.espondent at 16) ; Popp v.
LTtah :?d. 96, aa8 P. td 1:23 ( rn.39), (brief for Respon·
dent at 17 l&l :\Ioreover. one must accept Respondenfi
premise that under section 74-4-10
legitimate child must be legitimated by his father. ID
order to inherit from or through him, before placmg
any reliance whatever upon Respondent's use of cases
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relating to a now repealed statute for legitimation of
issue of plural marriages such as Rohwer v. District
(' 011 rt, 41 Ptah 279, 125 P. 671 (1912} and ltlansfield
r. Seff, 42 Utah 258, 134 P. 1160 (1913}. Brief for
Hesponclent at 5, 16, and 19. }"'urthermore, one must
accept Respondent's unsupported premise, that section
7-1---i-10 provides that an illegitimate child cannot inherit from his father unless his status is changed through
legitimation, before one can see any relevance in Respondent's lenhrthy catalog of authorities for the general
conflicts rule, that status is determined solely by the
law of the domiciles of the persons affected. Although
Appellants admit that the usual conflicts rule regarding status is the one here urged upon the Court by Respornlt>nt. it must be pointed out that continual reemphasis of that rule by Respondent is futile, because
section 74-4-10 is not a legitimation statute in fact and
clues not purport to affect the iliegitimate child's status
at all. Appellants' cases demonstrate that the statute
in question merely allows illegitimate children to inherit
from their mother, and from their father, if acknowle1lge!l by him, in the same manner as if born in lawful
wedlock.
After the formality of simple acknowledgement
the illegitimate's rights to inherit from his mother and
from his father are exactly the same, yet he is no more
and no less legitimate than he was before. If one accepts llespondent's argument that the statute legitimates a child when acknowledged by his f'ilher, one
would also be required, logically, to conclude that the
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illegitimate child is similarly legitimated when
by his mother, . which is oLviously an aLsurd conclusi
The language of the last sentence of section 74-4-!IJ
demonstrates that, when the Utah Legislature <lesirei
to describe a status of legitimacy, it accomplishes tliai
objective without ambiguity. That sentence proridei,
"The issue of all marriages null in law, or dissolved 01
divorce are legitimate." (Emphasis added).
statutes which provide for legitimation after birth (Uta\
Cocle Annotated, sections 78-30-12 and 77-60-14 (1953))
similarly demonstrate the ability of the legislature lo
make its intent on legitimation quite clear by use of
some form of the word, "legitimate". Brief for Appel·
lant at 13. It is significant that the first sentence of
section 7 4-4-10, the statute here i1wolved, on the olher
hand, avoids any internal indication of intent to legili·
mate children by its provisions.
The most recent enactment of the Utah Legisla·
ture relating to illegitimates is contained in Utah Code
Annotated, section 26-J;)-16, (Repl. l!)G!)) which prtr
vicles that persons legitimated or adopted may have th:ir
birth records changed. This statute contains obvious m·
ternal references to the legitimation by marriage statute
(section 77-60-14) and to the legitimation by
statute, (section 78-30-12) , while no hint of leg1tima·
tion by simple acknowledgement is to be found there.

Legitimated or Adopted PersonsSupplementar;y birth certificates. Any per·
26-15-16.
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son horn in this state: Legitimated b11 subsequent marriage of his natural parents, or whose
parentage has been determined by a court of
competent jmisdiction, or adopted under the
law existing at the time of adoption in this
state or any other state or territory of the
United States may request the state director
of vital statistics to file a supplementary certificate of birth on the basis of the status subseciuently acquired or established and of which
proof is established ... (Emphasis added).
Urnler this provision children, who have been legitimated
are entitled to a supplementary certificate of birth,
while illegitimate children who qualify for inheritance
under the provisions of the first sentence of section
74-4-10 are not entitJed to obtain a suppfomentary certificate of birth. Ergo, the legislature does not consider
the first sentence of section 74-4-10 to be a statute which
can change the status of illegitimate children to legitimate.
POINT II.
A IIOLDIN.G THAT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 74-4-10 (1953), IS A LEGITIMATION STATUTE, WOULD CAUSE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS
FOR THE VERY PERSONS THE STATUTE
WAS DESIGNED TO AID.

8

Respondent's much repeated, but unsupported, as.
sertion, that Utah Code Annotated section 7Hrn
( 195:3) is a legitimation statute, deserves to be examinea
in light of its broader implications in areas totallv un.
related to inheritance of decedent's property. The
of legitimacy carries with it a myriad of rights 3110
duties which are enforcable by and against the father.
A list of a father's rights with respect to his legitimate
child will point up the need for at least the minimal
formalities specified by the true legitimation statutes,
(i.e., Utah Code Annotated, sections 78-30-12 and 7160-14 ( 1953) ) as a protection to the illegitimate chil1l, '
to assure that the father and the child have a reasonably
normal family relationship in fact, before the father
acquires substantial rights in the child. It is easy to see
the potential for mischief, which would be generated bi
a power to legitimate through simple unilateral acknowl·
edgment, if that power were vested in a deprareu,
and/ or spiteful natural fa th er, who had no interest in
his illegitimate offspring's well being and who had no
intention of according the child the normal reciprocal
benefits of legitimacy. The clearest example of the
predicted c,·il woulcl he the convicted rapist, who follow·
ing his release from prison, boastfully or
acknowled<Ted
1ntternitv
of his victim's illegitimate clu!O
b
•
and then having wrought legitimacy, proceeded to ex·
ercise his paternal prerogatives. Appellants
submit the following list of additional incidents of
.
. IS
. argued, Is
. fairly w1t!J.
tnnate
status, none o f' wh'ich It
in the intent of the first sentence of section 74-4-JO:
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A legitimated child is required to support his
destiute father under the laws of many states. See, H.
D. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social PoliclJ, ( 1971)
at 25.
I.

The father of a legitimated minor child arguably is equally entitled to custody and guardianship of
the child as is the mother. See, Utah Code Ann. § 7513-18 (I 95H) . If legitimation were by simple acknowledgment, the mother would not enjoy the protections
with respect to her parental custody which an abandoned
wife would enjoy against the father. See, Utah Code
Ann.§ 30-2-10 (1953).
2.

The father of a legitimated minor child has
visitation rights, even though he would lack such rights
in most states so long as the child remained illegitimate.
Sec, I\rause, supra at 30-31.
3.

The father of a legitimated minor child must
consent to its adoption. See, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4
(1953), cf. Popp v. Roth, 9 Utah 2d. 96, 338 P. 2d 123
4.

( l!l59).

The father of a legitimated minor child arguably has an equal right to possession and control of his
earnings. See, Utah Code Ann. § 75-13-18 and 52,
(1953), but sec ·utah Code Ann. § 15-2-4 (Repl. 1962).
5.

The father of a legitimated minor child arguably has al'equal right to direct, and/or consent to, medi·
cal treatment, surgery and the like. See, Utah Code
Ann.§ 75-13-18 ( 1953).
6.
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7. The father of a legitimated minor child hil I
power to consent to use of the child's name and picture
for advertising and trade purposes if the child has no
legal guardian. ,'frc, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-8 (1953).
8. The father of a legitimated minor child hai :
power to receive and give receipts for small savings anu.
loan accounts following the child's death. See, Uta!
Cude Ann.§ 7-13-38 (1953).
9. The father of a legitimated minor child argu·,
ably has equal power to dissaffirm the child's contracts.
See, Utah Code Ann.§ 75-13-18 (1953), but see, Uta!'
Code Ann. § 15-2-2 ( Hepl. 19G2).

The father of a legitimated minor child has
power to settle claims of the child up to $10,000 with·
out having a legal guardian appointed. See, Utah
Ann.§ 75-JH-5:3 (rnn Supp.).
10.

The father of a legitimated minor child has
power to settle claims of the child on blanket accident
ancl sickness insurance policies and to receive the
ment sum. See, Utah Cude Aun. § 31-20-8 (1953).
11.

12. The father of a legitimated minor child mar
arguably take the child from its mother against her
without criminal liability for kidnapping unless she has
obtained a court order granting her legal custody or
guardianship. Sec, Utah Code Ann. § 76-35-1 (1953).
13. The father of a legitimated minor child has
equal power to consent to marriage of the minor. See,

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-9 (1953).
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The father of a legitimated minor child under
age J .J. can accept service of process upon the child by
accepting a copy thereof in conjunction with service
upon the child personally. U.R.C.P. 4 (e) (2).
i'
14.

The father of a legitimated minor daughter
arguably has the right to bring an action at law for her
seduction. Sec, Utah Code Ann.§ 78-11-5 (1953).
15.

The father of a legitimated child has a right
to inherit from the child. The father of an illegitimate
child has no such right. See, Utah Code Ann. § 74-4-11
IG.

(1953).

17.

The father of a legitimated minor child arguably has the right to bring an action for injury or death
of the child. See, Utah Code Ann.§ 78-11-6 (1953).
The legitimated child, of course, also obtains a
number of reciprocal rights against the father, none
of which seems to be contemplated by the first sentence
of section 74-4-10. One is inclined to doubt the practical
value of some of the following additional incidents of
legitimate status, if granted in the context of the simple
acknowledgment situation suggested by Respondent:
A duty of support is owed by the father to his
legitimated minor child, which duty would follow him
even to Idaho or Texas where the father of an illegitimate has no duty to provide support. See, Krause,
supra at 22.
1.

2.

The father of a legitimated child has a duty
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to provide higher education to the child to the extent of
his means. 1See, Krause, .rnpra at 25.
3. The legitimated child has the right to bear ana
use the natural father's name in all states. See, Krause,
supra at 32-33.

4. The legitimated child of a U.S. citizen and an
alien mother, though born abroad, acquires U.S. citizen·
ship if legitimation occurs before his age 21. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409 ( 2) ( b) ( 1953) .
5. The legitimated child has a right to have hii
birth record changed to delete all record of illegitimacy,
if born in certain states, hut not if born in Utah ana
merely "acknowledged" since only legitimation by
tion and legitimation by marriage are recognized for
this purpose. Sec, Utah Code Ann. § 26-15-16 (Repl
1969.

The foregoing catalogs of incidents of legitimate
status are illustrative only and do not purport to be
full, complete or exhaustive. Appellants believe, how·
ever, that they are more than ample to illustrate the
fallacy of reading full "legitimation" into a statutory
provision which was designed to convey only the right
to inherit.

POINT III.
COURTS THAT HAVE CONSTRUED
STATUTES SIMILAR TO UTAH CODE ANt·
NOTATED SECTION 74-4-10 (1953) HAVE DE
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J<:Hl\IIN ED THAT THE STATUTES DO NOT
LEGITll\IATE AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD,
nuT l\IERELY GIVE Hil\1 THE CAPACITY
TO 11' IIEJU T.
Appellants' brief attempted to gather those cases
constrni11g statutes similar to section 74-4-10 and inrn!Ying issues similar to that before this Court. Appellants have explained what those cases said and held, frequently using the langauge of the Courts. In an attempt
to cleny the impact of the relevant cases, Respondent
accuses Appellant of using "choice" and "incidental"
language from the opinions cited. Brief for Respondent
at7and10.
Respondent's attack upon Appellants' authorities
takes two approaches: ( 1) blanket attempts to distinguish groups of cases upon their facts (brief for
Respondent at 6, 10, 12, 21), and ( 2) attempts to tell
the Court what cases staucl for, by stating what category they are cited under in A.L.R., or by citing language from the same A.L.R. annotation in which the
case is mentioned. (Brief for Respondent at 8, 9, and
ll.) Much additional language from the sources upon
which Appellants rely can be cited in support of Appellants' position. This approach will, unfortunately,
elicit Respondent's attack on the grounds that the language chosen is "choice" and "incidental". Appellants
therefore submit that the true test of the cases they
have cited is a full reading of the texts of those cases

14

and they invite Respondent and the Court to make this
test.
As one example of a case with respect to which
representations made by Appellants and Respondent
are in diametric opposition to each other, a discussion
of .Moen v. 1'llocn, 16 S.D. 210, 92 N.,V. 13 (1902),
will be instructive. 1\ppellants cite this case as author·
ity for their contention that statutes similar to 74-4-10
have been construed not to affect status, but to affect
capacity of illegitimates to inherit only, thus requiring
no reference to the law of the state where the acknow].
edgment took place. Brief for Appellants at 10, 11.
Respondent claims that the South Dakota statute required legitimation, that there was not a granting of
succession without legitimation, and that the law of
status atthe father's domicile controlled. Brief for Re·
spondent at 10 and 11.
In illoen, the decedent was the father of the illegi·
tirnate claimant and died intestate in South Dakota. At
the time of his death, the relevant South Dakota statute
provided: "Every illegitimate child is an heir of the
person who, in writing, signc<l in the presence of a competen t witness, acknowledges himself to be the father
of such child." Id. at 14. It was argued that this st.atute
was not relevant because the onlv acknowledgment
which complied with the statute ( 1 ). was made in Nor·
way which had no similar statute, and (2) was made
several years prior to the date on which the statute was
adopted in South Dakota. The argument was, in other
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words, the same as that made in the instant case, that
because the statute creates a status, the applicable law
is that law in effect at the time of and at the place of
acknowledgment. The Court not only rejected this
argument, hut studiously avoided any mention of the
word "legitimation."
"The statute/ does not by its express terms,
support respondent's contention. It relates to
the subjcet of succession; it is broad and comprehensi,,e, and should be liberally construed
with a view to ef feet its objects and to promote
justice. Comp. Laws § 4763. Undoubtedly the
principal object of the legislature was to enable an illegitimate child to inherit its father's
estate and incidentally to prescribe the character of eviden<'e required to establish its paternity .... Its title is called into existence by the
death of its ancestor, and its rights are governed by the la\v in force at the time of such
death. 2 'Vashbr. Real Prop. pp 6-17. No one
can take real property except those who are
recognized as heirs by the law of the country
where the property is situated .... It describes
a class of persons, and declares that persons
of that description shall inherit. It does not refer to or create a status. It is prospective in
its operation as to the right, but there is nothing to suggest that persons of the class described-that is, illegitimates already recog-
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nized-shall not inherit under it. . .. If the
acts constituting the acknowledgment are in
themsehes such as the statute prescribes, they
confer the right to inherit in the state where
the real property is situated, without reference
to the intent with which they were perfonned."
Id. at 15.
Respondent argues that Appellants' cases invoJv.
ing inheritance by illegitimates from collaterials through
their mothers, are not pertinent to the instant case be·
cause here inheritance by Appellants must be through
the father of the illegitimate. Brief for Respondent at
6. This argument totally ignores the fact, that the only
difference provided by section 7 4-4-10 between inheri·
tance by an illegitimate from or through his mother and
inheritance from or through his father, is that he must
first be acknowledged by the father. Once the prerequisite of acknowledgment has been satisfied, the
statute provides that the illegitimate "inherits his or her
estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the
same manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock."
It makes no difference, for the purposes of this case
whether the child claims through its mother or through
its father since satisfaction of the Utah requirement
for acknowledgment by the father is conceded.
Respondent attempts to distinguish several cases
cited by Appellants on the grounds that in each case
the situs of decedent's property was the same as the
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state of domicile of the illegitimate's father. Brief for
Hespondent at 10. \Vhere the issue of residence or domicile of a decedent is mentioned in these cases, it is solely
for the purpose of establishing the legal situs of the
properties of his estate and the fact that the decedent
is coincidentally the father of the legitimate is irrelevant. All of these cases considered statutes similar to
section 7 4-4-10, and all concluded that these are statutes
allowing illegitimates to inherit, that they do not affect
status and that therefore there were no questions of
conflict of laws. The following statement of Respondent with respect to these cases is totally without foundation. "In no one of the cases was there a granting of
succession without legitimation." Brief for Respondent
at 11.
Respondent refers the Court to IO C.J.S. 55, § 11,
as support for the principle that acknowledgment by
the father is universally accepted as the principal means
of change of status of the illegitimate so as to inherit
as the heir of his father. Brief of Respondent at 7.
The section cited does not appear to support the general principle for which it is proffered. More importantly, this section cites the reader to IO C.J.S. Bastards,
§ 26.
"\Vhile a statute which gives a duly
acknowledged or recognized illegitimate child
the right to inherit from the father has been
regarded as remedial in nature and as one
which should be liberally construed to effect
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the purpose of its enactment, it is an inheritance statute or statute of descent and not a
legitimation statute, and, after recognition or
acknowledgment, the child remains illegitimate
and inherits as an illegitimate child."

In re Garr's Estate, 81 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906)
has been extensively discussed in the briefs of Appel·
lants and Respondent. 13ecause the Court in that case
discussed numerous issues, Respondent attempts to dis·
miss it off-hand as in-elevant, by a statement of one of
the questions dealt with hy the case:
"The real question in Garr was as to the
sufficiency of the facts constituting acknowledgment, and it is so cited at 33 A.L.R. 2d
7 44 in an annotation setting forth what
amounts to sufficient recognition under statutes affecting the status or rights of illegitimates." Brief for Respondent at 8.
This case is the leading Utah case upon two important
issues now before this Court: (1) Is section 74-4-lOa
legitimation statute affecting status which creates a
conflict of laws, or is it simply a statute affecting the
capacity of illegitimates to inherit in Utah, which in·
volves no problem of conflict of laws? (2) Does sec·
tion 74-4-10 allow heirs of illegitimates who meet the
requirements of the statute to inherit from
through their illegitimate parent and in the paternal hne
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of succession? Appellants submit that Garr's resolution
of these two questions resolves this case .

.J olm 'l'. Garr died intestate in Utah. The administrator petitioned for distribution of the estate to
brothers and sisters and to issue of the deceased brothers
of John T. Garr. The guardian of the minor children
of Johnnie Garr, deceased, claimed that the children
were the heirs of the decedent because J olmnie was the
illegitimate son of the decedent. The lower court granted the administrator's petition. The Court on appeal
first considered whether the evidence established the fact
that .Johnnie Garr was the illegitimate son of John T.
Garr, as the lower court had held that he was not. The
Utah Supreme Court oYerruled the finding of the lower
court and held that the evidence was more than sufficient to establish that Johnnie Garr was in fact the
acknowledged illegitimate son of John T. Garr. The
next question the Court faced was, whether the children
of .Johnnie GaiT could inherit through their illegitimate
father who had died intestate. The Court considered two
statutes: ( 1) the statute providing for adoption by
acknowledgment and (2) the statute providing for inheritance by an acknowledged illegitimate child. The
Court said that the intent of both statutes is to give the
child the same right to inherit as a legitimate child.
After some discussion of the legitimation by adoption statute, the Utah Supreme Court found guidance
in its interpretation of the predecessor of section 74-4-10
through a review of the Edmonds Tucker Law and the
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U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S.
682 ( 18D1), and found that these authorities had inter·
preted the statute as giving illegitimate children, who
are acknowledged, the same rights of inheritance from
and through their father as legitimate children, but did
not make such children legitimate.
"Under such interpretations made and indicated by the highest legislative and judicial
authorities of our country, can there be any
doubt as to the inheritable rights of illegitimate children, under the laws as they existed
up to 1887? Is there any doubt that the Legislature, when in view of that interpretation, it
re-enacted the statute of 1884, after the territory had been admitted into the Union as a
state intended that those rights should continue
to exist? 'Ve think not."

It is interesting to note that the language quoted by
the Appellant's brief from Cope v. Cope (brief of Ap·
pellants at 7) and referred to by Respondent as "choice
language" (brief for Respondent at 7) is the same Ian·
guage quoted from Cope v. Cope by the Utah Supreme
Court.
The Court held that the children of J olmnie Garr
could inherit because he was legitimated by adoption.
The Court also held that had Johnnie Garr not been
legitimated by adoption, his children could inherit
his father because Johnnie was an acknowledged illegi·
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timate son. The Court based the latter holding, in part,
011 the hroader proposition that illegitimates and their
children coul<l inherit even through collateral relatives.
The Court specifically held that the predecessor to section 74-4-10 is not a legitimation statute.
Respondent ignores the precedent value of Garr's
Estrdc and proceeds to the unsupported assertion that
"Section 74-4-10 gives no right of inheritance to illegitimate collateral kin." llrief for Respondent at 19. Apparently Hesponclent's argument is that because the
Utah J ,egislature has not used the more specific language which is found in the statutes of some other
states, it intends the inheritance by illegitimates to be
narrowly construed. The converse is in fact true. The
Utah Supreme Court in Garr's Estate, rejected the
argument that "the rights of an illegitimate and of his
(lesceJHlants, whatever they may be, are strictly lineal,
ne\'er collateral .. .'' [In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 577
8H P. 757, 7fll ( 1906) ], this interpretation of the statute
has been accepted by the Legislature which has retained
the statute since that 1906 decision. It follows that once
the illegitimate is acknowledged by its father, inheritance hy the illegitimate with respect to its father and
mother is identical.
There is a paucity of case law in other states dealing with the question of inheritance by and through illegitimates from collaterals in the paternal line. This
is partially explained by Respondent's brief which describes statutes specifically allowing such inheritance,
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and by statutes such as that of California which specifically forbids such inheritance. The only case of which
Appellants are aware, which considers the question in
a state with a statute similar to section 74-4-10, is
""'mith t'. Smith, 105 .Kan. 294, 182 P. 538 (1919). The
Kansas Supreme Court in answer to the question,
"whether under the statute an illegitimate child may in·
herit from the collateral kindred of his father," [Id. at
538] held that the statute should be given a liberal in·
terpretation to eff'ectuate its purpose and that an illegi·
timate child may inherit from the collateral kindred of
his father.
"The Legislature contemplated a relationship of succession not only with the father hut
also with the heirs of the father. 'Ve have no
doubt from the language used that the Legislature intended to give an illegitimate the status
of a general heir in the matter of the descent
and distribution of the property of an intestate .. ."Id. at 541.
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Annotated section 74-4-10 (1953)
allows an acknowledged illegitimate to inherit
property from and through his father, but does not legi·
l.

timate him.
2 Utah Code Annotated section 74-4-10 (1953)
·
d ·11 'timate
also allows descendants of an acknowledge I egi
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to inherit from and through the illegitimate's paternal
line.

Appellants, children of the decedant's half sister, are decedenat's heirs at law.
3.
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